Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 26

Issue 2

Article 5

Fall 9-1-1969

Picketing In Shopping Centers
Morris Forkosch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Morris Forkosch, Picketing In Shopping Centers, 26 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 250 (1969).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol26/iss2/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

PICKETING IN SHOPPING CENTERS
MORRIS FORKOSCH*

The commercial use of private property which intentionally results
in increased accessibility to the general public transforms the nature
for the property from purely private to quasi-public. Neither the right
to picket, as an exercise of free speech, nor a private property owner's
right to prevent trespassory invasions of his property is clearly established with respect to labor picketing. The recent and controversial
case of Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.' further muddied the picketing-free speech versus property
rights waters with respect to shopping centers. The case must be
understood and discussed in light of exactly what it decides and why,
as well as what it leaves untouched and undecided.
I.
The factual situation is not complex and it may be graphically
illustrated as follows: first draw a large circle and place an "L" upon
its circumference, thereby denoting Logan's privately-owned shopping
area; then place a "W" in the center to denote Weis' parcel of
privately-owned property upon which it built a supermarket; outside
the circle place a "U" for the Union; finally, with an arrow connect
the U to W with the shaft going through L.
This simple diagram illustrates the basic fact situation, who is
involved and why. It shows that to get at W's employees to proselytize
during working hours U had to cross the L property line; that L
might, in practical effect, be caught in the middle; that thereby L's
investment might become threatened because other businesses might
be afraid to buy or lease into a dogfight; that indirect pressure could
2
thus be exerted upon L to pressure W to settle.
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. BA. 1936, New York University;
LL.B. 193o, St. John's University; LL.M. 1932, St. John's University; J.S.D. 1948,
New York University.
1391 U.S. 3o8 (1968). The majority opinion was written by Justice Marshall, who
also spoke for Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Fortas and Stewart.
Justice Douglas concurred separately and Justices Black, Harlan and White each
dissented separately.
2
This is not the argument urged by either Logan or Weis. The Union's contention was that if the state injunction were to be upheld so that picketing could
only take place outside the shopping center, it would be very difficult for the
Union to limit the effect of the picketing solely to Weis. Justice Marshall recognized
this argument with the remark that the Union could conceivably find itself
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The actual facts as disclosed in the opinion demonstrate that Logan
developed a shopping center complex adjacent to the intersection of
a heavily traveled highway. This complex, which included extensive
parking areas between the stores, was isolated from the highway and
the intersecting road except for five entrances. Within the complex,
all of the property was owned by lessor Logan except for the property
that had been sold to Weis and upon which Weis had erected its
supermarket and parcel pickup area.
Weis opened for business on December 8, 1965, with a wholly nonunion staff of employees, and a few days later posted a sign on the
exterior of its building prohibiting trespassing or soliciting by anyone
other than its employees on its parcel pickup area or parking lot.
On December 17th members of the Union began picketing Weis. 3
Their signs stated Weis was anti-union and its employees were not
receiving union wages or other union benefits. The pickets varied
between 4 and 13, averaging around 6, and the picketing "was carried
out almost entirely in the parcel pickup area and that portion of the
parking lot immediately adjacent thereto."' 4 The Court noted that
the picketing was peaceful at all times and unaccompanied by either
threats or violence. Additionally, a footnote in the opinion disclosed
that the Union did not challenge that portion of the injunction
preventing the pickets "from blocking access by anyone to respondents' premises, making any threats or using any violence against
customers, employees, and suppliers of Weis, and physically interfering
with the performance by Weis employees... ." After the picketing
had continued for ten days, Logan and Weis jointly instituted an
equity action on the sole ground that the Union's conduct constituted
charged with conducting an illegal secondary boycott based upon common situs
picketing limitations. 391 U.S. at 323 n.12.
See e.g., Honolulu Typographical Local 37 v. NLRB, 4o F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir.
1968) in which the union, while involved in a dispute with employer-newspaper,
picketed five advertisers which were located in a privately owned shopping center.

The action of the union in picketing at the entrance to the shopping center was
held to be an unlawful secondary boycott under § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Wagner
Act.
.These pickets were not Weis employees but the employees of Weis' competitors; a fact which Justice Marshall correctly decides is unimportant. 391 U.S. at 315.
41d. at 311.

VId. at 312 n.4. What Justice Marshall means is that after the issuance of
the injunction, the picketing became peaceful and remained peaceful. He later
seizes upon this fact and the fact that the "non-speech" aspects of the picketing,
such as patrolling, did not disclose any significant interference with the use of
the mall by the public or Logan or Weis. Therefore, concluded the Justice, the
trespass prohibition in effect barred all speech within the shopping center. Id.
at 323.
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a trespass on their property. The ex parte injunction thus obtained
prevented the Union from picketing and trespassing upon Weis' storeroom and parcel pickup area, and separately from picketing and
trespassing upon Logan's parking area and all entrances and exits
leading to said parking area. The effect of this injunction was to stop
all picketing within the shopping center and to restrict it to areas
outside the shopping center and along the highways; the Union so
picketed and also distributed handbills asking the public not to
patronize Weis.0
II.

On this statement of the facts Mr. Justice Marshall ultimately determined that the question facing the court was "whether Pennsylvania's generally valid rules against trespass to private property can
be applied in these circumstance to bar petitioners [Union] from the
Weis and Logan premises. ' 7 His answer was no, and the main thrust
of, and support for, his reasoning centered upon the analogy of this
shopping center to a public or business area of a municipality. First,
however, it may be advantageous to give the negative aspect of the
opinion; that is, what the case did not concern itself with, and then
analyze the opinion for what was actually decided and why.
The case did not undertake to decide either of the Union's first
two contentions: that the state court was powerless to act because
of the National Labor Relation Board's exclusive jurisdiction; and
that section 7 of the Federal Labor Act protected the picketing activity
as a concerted activity for mutual aid or protections The Court
refused to do so because the Union had not argued these points below
OThe Union contested the injunction at an evidentiary hearing, lost and then
carried its appeals through the state courts to the United States Supreme Court.
A question arises as to whether the result would have been different if only Weis
had sought the injunction or if only Logan had sought the injunction, or if
each had sued independently of the other. See, e.g., Nahas v. Retail Clerks Local
905, 144 Cal. App. 2d 8o8, 3ox P.2d 932 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (only the tenant
sought an injunction and it was denied as there was no exclusive possession of
areas other than tenant's building); Spohrer v. Cohen, 3 Misc. 2d 248, 149 N.Y.S.2d
493 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (by implication) (the shopping center owner was successful in
gaining an injunction). But see Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers'
Union Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 906 (1965), where on a fact situation similiar to Logan Valley, the California supreme court rejected the inference that a tenant could not succeed without the aid of the center owner. This writer is of the view that the United States
Supreme Court would not alter its ruling if only the owner sued or if two
independent suits were brought.
7391 U.S. at 315.
'Id. at 3o9 n.i.
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and therefore the lower court had had no opportunity to consider
the pre-emption issue raised by these contentions. 9 Furthermore, the
question whether the state court's order, which continued the temporary injunction after an evidentiary hearing, was to be characterized as
permanent or temporary, was one with which the Court did not
concern itself because it was characterized as final for purposes of
review.' 0 Furthermore, because the picketing was directed specifically
at patrons of the lVeis market located within the shopping center and
the manner in which that particular market was being operated, the
Court did not pass on the separate question of whether Logan's property rights could justify the injunction against picketing which was
not directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping
center property was being put," i.e., what may be termed constitutional property rights versus third-party labor picketing' 2 rights which
do not interfere with the former. 13
Mr. Justice Marshall further delimited the holding by refusing to
consider whether an injunction would have been upheld if limited
solely to preventing picketing carried on in the parcel pickup area,
for, as he notes, the injunction issued was so broad "that by its terms
[it] clearly prohibits entry onto the entire mall premises to picket....
[A]nd no limiting construction has been placed on it by the Pennsylvania courts."' 4 In other words, the majority does not decide what
DId. at 314 n.7. Insofar as Justice Marshall's reference is concerned, if the
Pennsylvania courts had issued an injunction because of violations of state judicial
or statutory requirements which conflict with the federal labor statutory rights to
unionize and proselytize, there would have been such a federal-state conflict as
would permit pre-emption to overthrow the injunction. The state injunction, however, by-passed this aspect and limited itself to a trespassing basis.
20Id. at 312 n.5. See also, M. FoRKoscH, A TREATrSE ON LABOR LAw § 216
(2d ed. 1965).
"In other words, the unexpressed analogy is, for example, to a department
store which has independently owned businesses operating within it pursuant to
a leasing arrangement. For a discussion of this type of situation see note 64 infra.
Put differently, if the Union's picketing had been directed against Logan or
its property a different question might have been presented. This leads to an
intriguing thought: Weis was the only property owner, all others being lessees;
would identical picketing against Weis, if a lessee instead of an owner of the
property, now be "directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping
center property was being put?" To this writer the answer should be no, as this
factual change does not, in theory, insulate the employer from the picketing, and
direct harm, if any, to Logan would be identical. It is common knowledge that
shopping center leases are for long terms, and the practical effect is to make these
lessees analogous to owners.
n-rThe issue is free speech, whether or not it is private or collective and whether
or not it is for private benefit. But see Traux v. Raich, 239 US. 33 (1915).
13See, e.g., subdivision VIII infra.
2'391 U.S. at 322 n..
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effect a narrow and limited injunction would have entailed but instead
places the case in the factual context of a complete prohibition on all
picketing and handbill distributing.15 Thus, the conflict becomes one
of prohibiting picketing within the totality of the shopping center
even though factually there was a conflict only in the area of the
Weis market.
IlI.

Mr. Justice Marshall opens his opinion with the statement that
"the question [is] whether peaceful picketing of a business enterprise
located within a shopping center can be enjoined on the ground that
it constitutes an unconsented invasion of the property rights of tle
owners of the land on which the center is situated."' 6 It is suggested
that this formulation is too broad and somewhat ambiguous.
For example, the picketing is said to be "of," not around, or in
the neighborhood of, or limited to one part of Weis' supermarket.
One implication of this preposition permits it to be equated with
"solely," or "exclusively," so as to infer that the picketing did not
have any effect upon Logan or others. Moreover, the words "located
within" do not disclose that the picketed supermarket, though not
legally connected with Logan, the owner of the center (save undoubtedly by the usual forms of agreements to maintain the center, etc.),
nevertheless was in such an unbreakable geographical proximity to
it that for practical (picketing) purposes they were inextricably intertwined. Finally, the formulation of the question permits the implication that the pickets are conceivably being enjoined solely by Weis
although the reason immediately given relates only to Logan's property
7
rights.'
"Justice Black's dissenting opinion chides the majority on this point because
the injunction's decretal paragraphs separately enjoin Logan and Weis and these
"separately designated sections... are easily divisible." 391 U.S. at 329 n.2.
'Id. at 3og.
17
Justice Marshall's formulation, as quoted, refers to the injunction of a
trespass on the property "of the owners of the land on which the center is
situated." Both Weis and Logan owned their land, albeit Weis had an island
surrounded by Logan. Still, Justice Marshall speaks of "owners" as plural, although
he might be forgiven for this where a corporation is involved, but then uses the
preposition "on" in connection with "the center." While "land" might well become "lands" to disclose both property owners, and "on" thereby able to refer to
both, still, with "land" so used, "on" should have become "in" so as to restrict
the question to Weis. As used, therefore, ambiguity is present and this writer
construes the question as reasoning solely on the basis of Logan's property rights.
Factually, of course, the injunction is a double one, and the description given so
discloses, with both Weis' and Logan's own property rights being made the basis
for the injunction against the trespasses.
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What all this means is that one must adhere to the necessity of
limiting a decision to its facts (and their implications), and that the
language in the opinion should be read so as to separate dicta from
holding. Nevertheless, the question propounded at the opening of
this division must be read in conjunction with Mr. Justice Marshall's
later formulation given in the opening paragraph of the preceding
division, which he then answered by the analogy to the public or
business area of a municipality.
It is this later question and answer which are of interest now, for
there can be do doubt that ordinarily an admittedly open public
area in a city or town where business establishments are found, cannot be roped off by the refusal of a license for the exercise of public
and publicly-protected constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Marshall
seizes upon this to generalize and starts "from the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public
is... protected by the First Amendment."' I s But he must bring the

Logan Valley center into this premise.
Mr. Justice Marshall therefore discusses Marsh v. Alabama'9 in
which the distribution of religious tracts had been prevented by the
refusal of a license for this purpose. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the enforcement of a trespass statute as the factual situation
disclosed that the private, wholly-owned, company town and its
shopping district in practical effect were no different from, "and
there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center 0 except the fact that the title to the property belongs to
a private corporation." 21 The path of reasoning that is pursued is
substantially as follows: publicly owned business district streets and
sidewalks are open to and belong to the general public; privately
owned business district streets and sidewalks are open to all and are
used by the general public; privately owned driveways and sidewalks
within an enclosed shopping center are used by a significant portion
of the general public. Thus, he reaches the conclusion that "[t]he
19391 U.S. at 313. This premise is, to this writer, too broad for the facts of
the case. Such a description--"a location open generally to the public"-may apply
more aptly to a Marsh v. Alabama type situation.
2'326 US. 501 (1946).

mNowhere in the Logan Valley opinion is the term shopping district or shopping center used so as to equate it with the same term as used in Marsh, and
properly so. As the term was used by Justice Black in Marsh, it described any busy
place or block whether found in a village, town or city; these identical words mean
something else in Logan Valley. As we are dealing with concepts and ideas, rather
than the words that represent them, the difference noted is crucial.
13 9 1 U.S. at 317, quoting from, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946).
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similiarities between the business block in Marsh and the shopping
center in the present case are striking .... 22 [The basis for this is that]
the general public has unrestricted access to the mall property. The
shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the business district.., involved in Marsh.' 23
While, therefore, the ownership of private property traditionally
and normally carries with it the right to exclude those members of
the general public who seek to use the premises in a manner contrary
to the wishes of its owners, this could not apply here "because the
shopping center serves as the community business block 'and is freely
accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing
through.' .
-24 If it is not ordinarily open to the public then access
to it and for the purpose of exercising first amendment rights may be
denied altogether. 25 In other words, the use to which the property is
actually put is determinative of this constitutional question, even
though Logan, Weis, and Pennsylvania could still make reasonable
regulations governing the exercise of first amendment rights on their
property. For example, picketing in such a manner as to obstruct
or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from the
Logan or Weis property, or "with the intent of interfering with,
obstructing, or impeding the administration"20 of the business, or
where it will unduly interfere with the normal use of the public
property by other members of the public with an equal right of access
to it, can be regulated. However, none of these cases is applicable as
Pennsylvania's injunction prohibited all picketing. Thus there was
no occasion to consider the extent to which Logan and Weis (and
Pennsylvania) are entitled to limit the location and manner of the
picketing or the number of pickets within the mall in order to prevent
interference with either access to the market building or vehicular
-Justice Marshall thus takes Marsh, which involved a "business district" within
a company town, and reduces this "business district" to a "business block" and then
equates the business block with the Logan Valley shopping center.
2391 US. at 317-18.
2id. at 319, quoting from, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946). Justice
Black, in his dissent, objects to this formulation of the fact, i.e., freely accessible
and open to the public, by drawing a distinction between the public in general
and customers.
-See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
-6391 U.S. at 32o, quoting from, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
Here the equation of the mall is with "public property," so that anyone desiring
to enter must be admitted, although "use" now in effect restricts the public to the
general use for shopping center purposes and, as Justice Marshall next illustrates,
reasonable license requirements for parades along city streets are upheld so as to
limit interference therewith, 391 U.S. at 321.
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use of the parcel pickup area and parking lot.2 7 This therefore led
Mr. Justice Marshall to the conclusion that the Pennsylvania court's
restraints substantially hinder the communication of the idea which
the Union sought to express to Weis's customers.
What about a Logan justification for the injunction, excluding
Weis's reasons and support? Mr. Justice Marshall rejects any such
justification in two ways, first by an appeal to the consequences of
the rise of the shopping center, and then by an appeal to the Marsh
rationale. Thus he refers to the economic development of the United
States in the last 2o years which reinforces the court's opinion of the
correctness of the approach taken in Marsh; the statistics which show
the movement of population from cities to suburbs, and the rise of
the shopping center with its 37 per cent share of the total retail sales
in this country and Canada as of 1966. Mr. Justice Marshall concludes
that any other holding would have "substantial consequences for
workers seeking to challenge substandard working conditions, consumers protesting shoddy or overpriced merchandise, and minority
groups seeking nondiscriminatory hiring policies .... -28 The consequence of a contrary ruling would permit suburban businesses to do
what downtown city ones could not: namely, "immunize themselves
from similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaire of parking lots
around their stores" 29 To enforce the reasoning, reference is again
directed to the Marsh holding that ownership and absolute dominion
do not always equate, for when the owner opens up his property for
use by the public his private property rights are circumscribed by the
public's statutory and constitutional rights.30 Thus, Mr. Justice
Marshal repeats his earlier view that since the center is the functional
equivalent of a business block, then for free speech purposes it is to
be treated in a like manner. 31
It must be noted that Weis and Logan are not treated alike by
Mr. Justice Marshall in his reasoning and his conclusion. The Weis
injunction was denounced on the basis of the "how" of the picketing,
2-7d. at 321. Justice Marshall footnoted the fact that uncontested portions of
the injunction did accomplish precisely such a regulation of the picketing. The
argument by Logan and Weis that the injunction permitted outside picketing
and was therefore a permissible regulation, and not a prohibition, was countered
by the answer that a "regulation" would permit a degree of effective picketing,
but that the distance between the supermarket and the pickets was too great.
Id. at 321-22.
-1Id. at 324.

1id. at 325.
'0326 U.S. at 5o6.

3'39 1 U.S. at

325.
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that is, the picketing permitted outside the center and along the
highway was physically dangerous, inefficient, and insufficient, and
might conceivably also carry over into a violation of the federal secondary boycott rules. The Logan injunction was rejected because of the
"why" of the picketing, that is, otherwise workers could not
challenge
substandard working conditions, consumers could not inveigh against
shoddy merchandise, and concerned persons could not seek nondiscriminatory hiring, because the cordon sanitaire would prevent this.
IV.
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion takes the view that while
the Logan property cannot be equated with the Marsh company
town, still it has been opened to public uses and the concepts of
private property should not be used "to avoid this [picketing] incidence
of carrying on a public business" 32 when the public activity is constitutionally protected. He also agrees that picketing involves free
speech, and his conclusion is that the state court is "surely capable of
fashioning a decree" within such constitutional limitations.
V.
The dissenters' three opinions may be understood by leaving that
of Mr. Justice Harlan for a separate discussion and analyzing the
"Black-White" complementary views. Although not articulated in
this fashion, these Justices treat the Weis and Logan injunctions
separately, and also in conjunction; additionally they base their approach first, on the ordinary inviolability of private property save
where valid exceptions have been constitutionally formulated, statutorily, or by judicial decision, and second, on the premise that there is
little resemblance between the shopping center involved in this case
and the property involved in Marsh.
The Weis injunction is first defended by these Justices on the
basis of established private property concepts. Mr. Justice Black's
statement of the Weis operations makes it clear to him that, as the
supermarkets must now operate and function, their "pickup zones
are as much a part of these stores as the inside counters where customers select their goods or the check-out and bagging sections where
the goods are paid for."3 3 On this basis, therefore, permitting any
picketing or handbill distributing could now be logically extended
8'Id. at S26.
3Id. at 328.
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so that "[i]t would be just as sensible for this Court to allow the pickets
to stand on 3"1 the check-out counters, thus interfering with customers
who wish to pay for their goods, as it is to approve picketing in the
pickup zone which interferes with customers' loading of their cars." 35
Mr. Justice White asseverates this fear and goes even farther: "I
am fearful that the Court's decision today will be a license for pickets
to leave the public streets and carry out their activities on private
property, as long as they are not obstructive." 36 It is because of these
extension fears37 that Mr. Justice Black at the very least, desires that
the wholly severable part of the injunction aimed at the pickup zone
be affirmed, 38 and it is this same fear that causes Mr. Justice White to
deny "that when the owner of private property invites the public
to do business with him he impliedly dedicates his property for other
uses as well."39
The Logan injunction, and apparently that of Weis, is defended
by Mr. Justice Black on additional grounds, i.e., Logan's also comes
under private property grounds as did Weis', but now a fifth amendment approach is included. He excoriates the majority because their
support for the Union means that it can come onto Logan's property
for the purpose of picketing and refuse to leave when asked despite
trespass laws. This, in effect, deprives Logan of his property without
just compensation; therefore, he urges, that if the Court is going to
arrogate to itself the power to act as the Government's agent, then
the fifth amendment requires it to award just compensation to Weis.
The Logan injunction conceptually necessitates that Marsh be
considered. 40 If the Weis pickup zone could ever be considered dedicated to the public or to pickets, then, of course Marsh would here be
involved, but according to Mr. Justice Black, "I cannot conceive how
such a pickup zone, even by the wildest stretching of Marsh v. Alabama ... could ever be so considered dedicated to the public or to
31The word "at" would, in all probability, better express the Justice's meaning.

1391 U.S. at 329.
"Id. at 339.
c"One may, of course, suggest that forty years ago Holmes answered such an
approach by writing, "It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to
point out shortcomings of this sort." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
0 3 9 1 U.S. at 329. Justice Black terms the Weis portion of the injunction the
really important part of the injunction because, as the majority opinion admits,

the picketing occurred almost exclusively in this area.
-Id. at 339.
'1Weis steps into Logan's shoes at this point to assert his claims against the
picketing. If Logan did not object, then Weis could not have urged the same
arguments as Logan had urged. See note 7 supra.
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pickets." 41 Mr. Justice White agrees, for his dissent is limited to the
majority's connection between the shopping center complex and the
Marsh company town.
Mr. Justice Black rejects any Marsh analogy because it "was never
intended to apply to this kind of situation."4 2 That case "dealt with
the very special situation of a company-owned town" 43 which "for
all practical purposes had been turned into a town" 44 indistinguishable from any other town in Alabama. Thus he points out that there
are no homes in the shopping center, no sewage disposal plant, post
office or policemen, and only two stores on the property when the
injunction was issued. The majority's erroneous misreading and distorted use of Marsh so as to reduce its plural factual requirements of
a "town" to but the one of a business district is, according to the
Justice, a judicial extension which finds no justification in the Constitution. And, finally, the majority's reliance on the invitation concept
(i.e., Logan and Weis invited the public into the shopping center,
in effect opened the area to the public use, and therefore permitted
the Marsh application) is "contrary to common sense." He points
out that "customers" were so invited, not "the whole public," for
these latter were:
no more wanted there than they would be invited to park free
at a pay parking lot. Is a store owner or are several owners together less entitled to have a parking lot set aside for customers
than other property owners? To hold that store owners are
compelled by law to supply picketing areas for pickets to drive
store customers away is to create a court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private ownership
of property rests in this country. And of course picketing, that
is patrolling, is not free speech and not protected as such. (Citations omitted.) These pickets do have a constitutional right to
speak about Weis' refusal to hire union labor, but they do not
have a constitutional right to
compel Weis to furnish them a
4
place to do so on its property. 5
Mr. Justice White's approach in all this is fundamentally the same
as Mr. Justice Black's, but he also argues that even if the Logan
Valley Shopping Center could be said to have some aspects of "public"
property "it is nevertheless true that some public property is available
1391 U.S. at 328.
"-Id. at 33o.
3
1d.
"Id. at 331.
4-Id. at 332-53. Justice White later goes into greater detail to show the limited
nature of the "invitation" extended by Logan, Weis and the other commercial
establishments. Id. at 338.
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for some uses and not for others; some public property is neither
designed nor dedicated for use by pickets or for other communicative
40
activities."
Mr. Justice White then urges some hypotheticals, e.g., that while
only labor picketing was now being upheld, the rationale
would also compel the shopping center to permit picketing on
its property for other communicative purposes, whether the
subject matter concerned a particular business establishment
or not. Nonobstructive handbilling for religious purposes,
political campaigning, protests against government policies the
Court would apparently place of these activities carried out on
Logan's property within the protection of the First Amendment, although the activities may have no connection whatsoever with the views4 7of the Plaza's occupants or with the conduct
of their businesses.
He was also concerned as to any future "line between 'shopping
centers' and other business establishments which have sidewalks or
parking on their own property. . .. "4
Mr. Justice White's concluding remarks in effect limit the first
amendment's reach to only official interference with speech and
not to a situation when the owner of private property invites the
public to do business with him. In Marsh "the State was deemed to
have devolved upon the company the task of carrying out municipal
functions,"49 i.e., the company was an agent of the state and therefore
official interference with speech occurred, whereas here the alleged
"streets" in Logan Valley Plaza were not like public streets. He feels
that a different case would be presented if Congress permitted picketing
on private property, e.g., "either to further the national labor policy
under the Commerce Clause or to implement and enforce the First
Amendment....,,0
VII.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan pointed up the loophole which
the majority would not take so as to avoid the first amendment holding. He felt that the pre-emption ground, i.e., that the Pennsylvania
courts had strayed into the area reserved for initial decision by the
National Labor Relations Board might have been used so that the
supremacy clause, and not the first amendment, would have applied.
'Bld.
'7391 U.S. at 339.

lId. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
'OId. at g4o.
wO~d.
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However, as the Union did not raise this question, and the state
courts did not discuss it, Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the court
had no jurisdiction to consider it. Mr. Justice Harlan devoted one
paragraph to the free speech issue. He felt it was not an appropriate
question to decide as "we can take notice that this is an area in which
Congress has enacted detailed legislation and has set up an administrative agency to resolve such disputes in the first instance."' 1 Thus the
court should have dismissed the writ as "improvidently granted."
This would not be unfair to the Union as it was its own fault in
failing to raise the pre-emption question. 52 In effect, Mr. Justice
Marshall did not disagree with the conclusion. If the state court had
"relied on the purpose of the picketing and held it to be illegal,
substantial questions of pre-emption under the federal labor laws
3
would have been presented."5
VIII.

There are several aspects of Logan Valley which may be examined
with profit. There is no question that restrictive labor practices do
exist in the supermarket industry,54 and that without some governmental intervention analogous to that given in the 193o's by the
Wagner Act to labor, organization here would be hampered, if not
prevented. Mr. Justice Harlan advocated that the governments'
chosen agency should act; this writer agrees. Just because the Union
failed to argue pre-emption does not require the Court to review a
bad case for only bad law can result.
For example, Marsh is justified on its facts, i.e., a true company
town to which the state had in effect delegated its powers; a delegation of a part of a state's powers to a huge interstate bus terminal 5
or to a world's fair5 6 is likewise justified. In all these situations there
is a dedication of otherwise semi-private or quasi-public property to
a public use, and in effect the property is not limited to any particular
group either expressly or impliedly. Thus, a public bus terminal
welcomes the general public to its commercial concessions to shop,
'id. at 336.
rid. at 237. Justice Harlan also commented: "For the establishment by this
Court of a rigid constitutional rule in a field where Congress has attempted to
strike a delicate balance between competing economic forces, and in circumstances
where we cannot know how the controversy would be settled by Congress' chosen
instrument, may also have a considerable disruptive effect." Id. at 337.
5391 U.S. at 314 n.7.
5See H. NORTHRUP, RESTRICTIVE LABOR PRACTICES IN THE SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY
(1967).
65Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968).
1Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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and the concessionaires pay a rental which envisages not only a
profit from the bus users but also from non-users. Likewise, a commercial fair welcomes all, and its entrepreneurial aspects are present
even though the public interest and welfare are separately served.
But a shopping center cannot be equated with such an embracing
public interest or, as the dissent points out, with a Marsh company
town. And in Wolin v. Port of New York Authority,57 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that while "a
uniform and absolute prohibition"' 8 upon the exercise of first amendment rights could not be defended where only leaflets were involved,
on the ground that littering would occur, still, there remained "the
problem whether picketing, marches, placards and similar modes of
communication are afforded comparable respect under the Constitution."59
To illustrate further, one state's high court has upheld the use of
ordinary card tables on a public street so as to distribute political
literature; 60 nevertheless, Wolin refuses to permit these under all
circumstances. 01 Thus there are limits even in a situation far more
"public" than in Logan Valley. While Mr. Justice Marshall did not
reject reasonable limitations, he argued that the state court's absolute
prohibition there made it unnecessary "to consider the extent to which
respondents are entitled to limit the location and manner of the
picketing or the number of pickets within the mall in order to prevent
interference with either access to the market building or vehicular
use of the parcel pickup area and parking lot."0 2 In other words,
according to Mr. Justice Harlan, the Union's error was in failing to
urge pre-emption, according to Mr. Justice Marshall the error of
7392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
1;Id. at 91.
Old. at 92. The Second Circuit felt that the regulations issued by the terminal
manager were "an excessive delegation [by the bi-state Authority] of unfettered
discretion placed in [his] power... and that therefore they are unconstitutional."
Id. at 93. The court therefore upheld the nisi prius direction that the Manager
promulgate new regulations carefully drawn to control the conduct of plaintiff
and similar groups within the building. No one can question the legitimate public
interest in maintaining a free flow of traffic in the Terminal, in avoiding excessive
disruption of normal activities there, in ensuring the convenience and movement
of passengers and vehicles. To meet this need, the relevant authority, whether
municipal or otherwise, may prescribe "rules of order" for the use of the premises.
The character of the place, including the number of persons passing through at
different times and the enclosed design of the forum, will affect the degree of
restriction tolerable under the Constitution. Id.
"People v. Katz, 21 N.Y.2d 132, 233 N.E.2d 845, 286 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1967).
OSee note 59 supra.
0391 U.S. at 321.
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Logan Valley was in obtaining too broad an injunction. If this is
true then, as a matter of practice, the attorneys for Logan Valley
could easily re-apply for a narrower, and yet sufficiently-broad injunction which, if proper findings of fact were made, could prevent effective
picketing. Put differently, Mr. Justice Marshall and the majority
have permitted a degree of state action which Mr. Justice Harlan,
through the supremacy clause, would have foreclosed. Whether the
Union has won a pyrrhic victory is a question not yet resolved.
There is another aspect of Logan Valley which is deserving of attention, namely, the concept of a business affected with a public
interest.6 3 In his short concurrence Mr. Justice Douglas refers to the
Plaza as "a public business" and Mr. Justice Marshall's final paragraph
quotes from Marsh: "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens
up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights
of those who use it."104 Neither Justice goes so far as to say that Logan
Valley is "a business affected with a public interest" in the tradition
of The GrangerCases65 and Nebbia v. New York, 66 but for all practical
purposes they do utilize this concept vis-&t-vis the first amendment.
Restated, under the traditional approach, a business so effected was
subject to a degree of governmental control as to certain of its otherwise private entrepreneurial rights. Under the present approach, a
retail business which is held to be a "public" one, i.e., its property
is dedicated to and/or used by the public, is now required to permit
handbill distribution, picketing, etc., although these are subject to
reasonable (private or governmental) regulation.
If this reasoning is accepted, then when is a retail business not a
public one? Almost by definiton, at least in this country, every such
business seeks public support, is "dedicated to the public" because it
could not otherwise exist. How any retail business could seek such
support without writing to, inviting, encouraging, and even "pulling
in" customers is beyond this writer. Every retail business6 7 opens its
"property" in some degree to the public, dedicates it to them in a
fashion, and is therefore affected by what they do, and so the only
insulation a small businessman has against the fears expressed by
Justices Black and White ultimately depends upon the interpretation
3

1 See M. FoRuoscI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 393 (1963).

U.S. at 325; quoting from, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 5o,
6594 U.S. 113 (1876).
66291 U.S. 502 (1934).
67See, e.g., International Union of Electrical Workers Local 761
U.S. 667 (ig6i), for an example of the Supreme Court's limitation
"reserved gate" policy with respect to non-retail businesses in labor
M3 9 1

506 (1946).

v. NLRB, 366
on the Board's
disputes.
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of five Justices in determining the reasonableness of the particular
union activity.63
For example, since 189o the United States Supreme Court has,
on due process grounds, checked "reasonableness" in administrative
rate-making,69 and at least since 194o has so examined picketing as
an extension of free speech.70 Federal and state legislation in this latter
area has occurred and has been judicially accepted or rejected in whole
or in part.7 1 To an unprecedented degree, over the past four decades,
the judiciary has favored personal and individual rights72 under con-

stitutional clauses, which in effect means that governmental and/or
other rights have generally diminished. Perhaps this is why Mr. Justice
Black felt some award of just compensation should be made; although
in the light of history, politics, economics, sociology, and practical
considerations, the legislatures and the judiciary have been doing this
indirectly, if not directly, ever since the birth of the republic. 73 What
is required is a continuing accommodation on the part of government
and all participants, for otherwise the rigidity engenders insoluble
tensions which eventually break through.
Perhaps this is the answer to Logan Valley, namely, that the legislature (federal or state) should determine this policy. It is the government which licenses, permits, and authorizes such a complex and
therefore has a degree of continuing jurisdiction. This does not necessarily require that a legislature compel a shopping center to open
its gates and its entire area to all picketing, as the question of a
proper state or federal policy enters. 74 For example, in Logan Valley
it was the supermarket, not the center, which was the Union's target,
"A union's peaceful "consumer picketing," directed to informing the public
that a product sold by a retailer is the subject of a dispute by this (or another)
union with the product's manufacturer has been upheld. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); see also NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377
U.S. 46 (1964); Minneapolis House Furnishing Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961).
Separately, a consumer organization's peaceful picketing to compel a retailer
to hire Negroes has been upheld as a "labor dispute." New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Co., S3 U.S. 552 (1938). Contra, Huges v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460 (1950), aff'g 32 Cal. 2d 85o, 198 P.2d 885 (1948).
Logan Valley's holding thus permits at least all this type of activity and,
perhaps, political activity, even though Justice Marshall rejected present consideration of decisions in this area because "none of these cases is applicable to the
present case."
cE.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
'6Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
71See M. FoRKOscH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW ch. XI (2d ed. 1965).
12
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
3
See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (ii Pet.) 496 (1837).
7'See

M. FomaoscH, A

TREATISE ON LABOR

LAW

§

259 (2d ed. 1965).
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so that by analogy to either the primary-secondary "signalling" type
of picketing, 75 or to the ambulatory and common situs and ally and
unity of interest doctrines, 76 one may see that pragmatic accommodations have occurred.
IX.
Conclusions as to the repercussions of Logan Valley are logically
available, but policy does not necessarily follow logic. Nevertheless,
from the fact that of the Logan Valley majority of six (Mr. Justice
Douglas concurring separately) only Mr. Chief Justice Warren is retiring at the end of the 1968 term,77 one may superficially assume that
a majority of at least five will continue to support the holding on its
facts, even if not agreeing with every implication of Mr. Justice
Marshall's language. This, however, does not square with Mr. Justice
Douglas's concurrence for his language says that where the property
is "opened... to public uses," and the center's business and the picketing of the retailer are 'directly related," then he would reject an absolute prohibition on all union picketing. However, the Justice in
effect would uphold a state court which, within constitutional limitations, is capable of fashioning a decree. In other words a numbers
game may not be possible, so that any new Justice may really be a
deciding vote.
Regardless, it is possible that the Court will uphold geographical
(the "where") restrictions, designed to prevent even peaceful union
activity anywhere in the shopping center's area 7s except that which
is contiguous to or directly or immediately related to the object of
the activity (of course if the center itself is such an object a different
question arises). 79 This does not deal with the "why" of the picketingsO
for then a different question might conceivably involve even the supermarkets.
Separately from the aspect of union picketing is the question of
non-union groups. For example, Mr. Justice Marshall's language em15NLRLB v. Denver Building & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951);
see also, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951).
"See M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 440-449 (2d ed. 1965).

77This article was written prior to the resignation of Mr. Justice Fortas. Editors
note.

wrhe fears of Justices Black and White are not discussed because there is
little doubt that the otherwise valid trespass laws would be upheld-although one
may seriously question this conclusion.
Justice Marshall refused to pass on these questions because they were not
raised by the record.
8See subdivision III supra.
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phasizes the ideas sought to be conveyed by the Union, but he specifically includes, as purveyors of other ideas, groups of consumers
protesting shoddy merchandise, or minorities protesting discriminatory hiring practices. 8' One may argue that his wording creates an
umbilical cord between the various protest groups mentioned and
Weis. However, such a viable connection does not ordinarily exist,
e.g., an anti-Vietnam group, a religious body attempting to proselytize,
the Red Cross, and either Weis or Logan or both. Therefore, it may
be concluded, Logan Valley is limited, is not to be expanded, and
is really a labor, not a civil rights or free speech decision even though
drawing upon these for a rationale.
Assuming either a limitation or a nonlimitation upon the groups,
i.e., the "who" of picketing, then are demonstrations, i.e., the "how,"
to be permitted? That is, can only traditional foot-sign picketing occur?
If, for example, Logan Valley has opened its center to the public and
is the functional equivalent of a business block, then one step more
should permit a card table to be used. As Wolin points out, the
Supreme Court has not yet specifically determined how far first
amendment communication rights extend beyond handbill distributing. Thus, even if handbill distributing is limited to unions, consumers,
and minorities connected to Weis as already indicated why not permit
a table for this purpose? This appears to be acceptable under Mr.
Justice Marshall's approach. But even so, can the handbill tradition
permit the modern-day demonstration, or any of its variations? It is
opined that Logan Valley does not go as far as Marsh, although using
Marsh's reasoning, and that a complete dedication to the public has
not been found. As a consequence, a limited or quasi-public use is
upheld, not a generalized one, and only when there is some economic
or analogous connection between the pickets and a business or
shopping center will a degree of demonstration be allowed.

8391 US. at 324.
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